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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
expenditure is large or small. 7 This type of an action is not an interference
with the discretionary powers of an officer when it prevents him from doing
that which which he has no legal right to do.8
Generally the individual has no remedy where evidence is obtained illegally
by police officers since illegally obtained evidence is admissible in the major-
ity of state courts.9 However, one effect of the decision in the instant case is to
provide an indirect remedy by denying law enforcemaent agencies the funds
to gather such illegal evidence. 1  WLLIAM J. MCMENAMY
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - REVIEW - TRIAL DE Novo IN DISTRICT COURT
BY VIRTUE OF APPEAL Is NOT THE EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. -
Defendant was found guilty in police magistrate's court of violating a city
ordinance. The District Court dismissed defendant's appeal on the grounds
that a trial de novo in the district court, as prescribed by statute, is the
exercise of original jurisdiction,l and because no other method of appellate
procedure is provided for with respect to the police magistrate's court. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota, held, that a trial anew in a district court
is not the exercise of original jurisdiction by the district court and therefore,
is not violative of the police magistrate's original jurisdiction. Minot v. Davis,
84 N.W.2d 891 (N.D. 1957).
Despite the fact that the court in the instant case stated their holding
as settled law in this state, the constitutional and statutory provisions concern-
ing an appeal from police magistrate's court appear to be in conflict. Article
1132 of the North Dakota Constitution provides that police magistrates shall
have jurisdiction of all cases arising under the ordinances of cities. The
legislature has conferred upon police magistrates exclusive jurisdiction in a11
cases arising under ordinances of cities.3 Thus, it would. appear that the
police magistrate has exclusive original jursdiction over the violation of city
ordinaces.
In regards to appeal, the constitution 4 provides that the district court
shall have original jurisdiction except as otherwise provided for in the con-
stitution, and that appeals shall lid from the county, justice of peace, and
police magistrate's court in accord with such regulations as the law will pre-
scribe. 5 The legislature in section 33-1234 of the codeo provides that appeal
may be had from a justice of the peaceor a police magistrate sitting as a
justice of the peace in criminal matters. Section 40-1819 of the code7 provides
7. See Trickey v. Long Beach, 101 Cal. App.2d 416, 226 P.2d 694 (1951); Brown
v. Boyd, 33 Cal. App.2d 416, 91 P.2d 926 (1939); Crowe v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117,
193 Pac. 111 (1920); Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367 (1915).
8. Viestenz v. Arthur Tp., 78 N.D. 1029, 54 N.W.2d 572 (1952).
9. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3d ed., 1940). Technically the individual has a
right of action in tort against the law enforcement officer who obtains the evidence
illegally, however, this remedy is illusory. See Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d
690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
10. See Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App.2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948).
1. Under § 113 of the N.D. Const. and § 40-1801 of the N.D. Rev. Code (1943) ex-
clnsive original jurisdiction over the violation of city ordinances is vested in the police
magistrate. (Emphasis added)
2. N.D. Const. art. IV, § 113.
3. N.D. Rev. Code § 40-1801 (1943).
4. N.D. Const. art. IV, § 103.
5. N.D. Const. art. IV, § 114.
6. N.D. Rev. Code § 33-1234 (1953 Supp.).
7. N.D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 266, § 1.
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for an appeal to the district court from any judgment of a police magistrate's
court in the same fonm and manner as appeals are taken and perfected from
a judgment of conviction of a defendant in a justice court. That procedure
calls for a trial anew in a district court.s
The case law in North Dakota on this subject indicates that: trial anew
in a district court involves original jurisdiction, not appellate jursdiction and
that an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction and confers it upon the
district court;9 that an appeal and a trial de novo from county court to the
district court is not violative of articles 111 or 114 of the constitution; 10 and
that the Juvenile Court Laws do not violate article 113 which provides for
jurisdiction of all cases arising under city ordinances."
The case law in other states which construes "appellate" and "original"
jurisdiction appears to be, in general, that a trial de novo in an. appellate
court is the exercise of original jurisdiction by that court. 12 Appellate juris-
diction is the resort to a superior court from an inferior tribunal to revise
the judgments of the latter."' This is the sense in which the expressions have
been used by legal writers."- Appellate jurisdiction is generally confined to
the correction of errors committed by the trial court and its jurisdiction
cannot be extended beyond that conferred by the constitution unless subse-
quent constitutional provision is made to cover such instance.1 5
It is submitted that the constitutional and statutory provisions in regards
to appeal and jurisdiction, if not in conflict, at least produce confusion. The
case law has not sufficiently decided the question and the only method of
clarification would seem to be the resort to legislative action. 1 6
JOHN M. ORBAN
8. N.D. Rev. Code § 33-1116 (1943).
9. See Nomland Motor Co. v. Alger, 77 N.D. 29, 39 N.W.2d 899 (1949); In re
Cuon, 76 N.D. 589, 38 N.W.2d 280 (1949); Bryan v. Miller, 73 N.D. 487, 16 N.W.2d
275 (1944).
10. In re Nysteun's Estate, 80 N.W.2d 671 (N.D. 1956); In re Peterson's Estate,
22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751 (1912).
11. State ex rel. City of Minot v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673, 59 N.W.2d 514, 547 (1953)
(In this 3-2 decision, the' dissenting justices said, "The power which the statute thus
purports to vest in the juvenile judge collides directly with the jurisdiction of the police
magistrate under section 113 of the constitution. The constitution being supreme, the
statute must yield.").
12. See State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941) (The jurisdiction to
decide causes anew is original jurisdiction). See also In re Constitutionality of House Bill
No. 222, 262 Ky. 437, 90 S.W.2d 692, 693 (1936) (The Supreme Court of Kentucky
quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 175 (1803) said, "It is the essential
criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that cause."); In re Burnette, 73 Kan. 609, 85 Pac.
575 (1906) (Jurisdiction to consider causes de novo, on appeal, is original, not appellate
jurisdiction.).
13. In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 262 Ky. 437, 90 S.W.2d 692 (1936).
Contra, Cavanaugh v. Wright, 2 Nev. 166 (1866) (Appellate jurisdiction in its broad sense
may be a review of the proceedings of the lower court or a trial de novo.).
14. See In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 262 Ky. 437, 90 S.W.2d 692
(1936).
15. See Sanborn v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 42 Cal. App.2d 99, 108 P.2d 458
(1940) (Appeal is not a trial but simply a method of rectifying errors that may have
occurred at trial). See also State ex rel. Wallace v. Baker, 19 Fla. 19 (1882); State v.
Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941).
16. If it is held that no constitutional right of appeal exists from a judgment of a
police magistrate's court, possibly this shortcoming could be adequately disposed of by
the issuance of a writ of certiorari. See N.D. Rev. Code § 32-3301 (1943); Espeland v.
Police Magistrate's Court, 77 N.D. 29, 49 N.W.2d 394 (1951); Crum, The Writ of Certior-
ari in North Dakota, 27 N. Dak. L. Rev. 271 (1951).
